The Great Recession of 2007-9 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were triggered by the collapse of asset-price bubbles. However, preexisting structural imbalances in the US economy were the reason why the burst of speculative bubbles induced a general economic collapse. This paper argues that the imbalance created by the combination of stagnant labor earnings and surging corporate profits not only played a leading role in the run-up to the downturns but was chiefly responsible for the slow recoveries. On the one hand, the relative stagnation of labor income represented a key factor behind rising income inequality and a potential drag on consumption which was temporarily alleviated by credit expansion; hence, the rising household debt levels which eventually became unsustainable. On the other hand, rising corporate profits created an overhang of idle money, eager to lend itself to speculative ventures, which played a key role in fueling the stock market bubble of the 1920s and the housing bubble of the 2000s. The paper further argues that despite various superficial and deeper similarities between the circumstances surrounding the Great Recession and the Great Depression, some fundamental differences in the structure of the US economy then and now suggest vastly different future prospects for American capitalism.
Introduction
The panic that started in the US mortgage and securities markets in the summer of 2007 triggered a domestic and global, financial and economic crisis which became widely known as the Great Recession (GR). In more respects than one, the GR was an unusual crisis. What sets this downturn apart from all other crises in post-Depression US history is that the officially announced end of the recession in June 2009 was not followed by anything resembling a typical postwar recovery. While corporate profits quickly returned to and surpassed pre-recession levels, investment and employment have been unusually slow to recover.
The GR has evoked numerous comparisons with the deepest structural crisis of the twentieth century -the Great Depression (GD) of the 1930s. Both downturns were triggered by asset-price bubbles -a stock market bubble in the late 1920s and a housing bubble in the 2000s.
However, preexisting structural imbalances in the US economy were the reason why the burst of speculative bubbles induced general economic collapse. This paper examines one of those imbalances arising from the highly unequal growth of property income relative to labor income. My key argument is that the combination of relatively stagnant labor income and surging corporate profits not only played a leading role in the run-up to the downturns but was chiefly responsible for the slow recoveries. This analysis reveals similar dynamics behind the boom and the bubble of the 1920s and the 2000s: sluggish wage growth and falling labor share of national income, deepening inequality with heavy concentration of wealth gains at the top of the income distribution, correspondent mounting indebtedness among lower-and middle-income households, surging corporate profits and a corporate saving glut seeking financial ventures. Thus, two causal mechanisms underlay the structural fragility of the economy then and now. On the one hand, the stagnation of labor earnings represented the key factor behind rising income inequality and a potential drag on consumption which was temporarily alleviated by credit expansion; hence, the MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ stages of the business cycle, credit offered by private banks and financial markets can significantly contribute to economic expansion by stimulating production and consumption. Traditionally, central banks have been conditioned to react primarily to inflation concerns. Thus, if for whatever reason the price level remains relatively stable, the central bank has little incentive to interfere with the growing 'prosperity'. But even without a rise in the general price level, credit expansion eventually translates into inflation of asset values. There are different channels through which a credit boom may lead to financial distress depending on what particular asset class becomes the main target of investors and speculators. Housing and securities are typically the most favored targets. The GD and the GR were both preceded by a housing market and a stock market bubble, although in a reversed order.
The ready availability of credit to the US economy played a key role in the economic expansion of the 1920s. The credit boom was particularly pronounced in the second half of the decade reaching its peak in 1928 (Eichengreen & Mitchener, 2004) . Credit expansion unfolded in three distinct but mutually reinforcing directions. The first direction was related to an upsurge of mortgage lending particularly boosted by new entrants into the business. Mortgage funding, which had accounted for less than 45 percent of residential construction finance before World War One, reached almost 60 percent at the height of the housing boom in the mid-1920s (White, 2009 ). The second direction concerned the consumer revolution of the 1920s characterized by a shift to major consumer durables with the automobile playing the most prominent role at the expense of minor consumer durables, nondurables, and savings (Olney, 1991) . The key lever of rising spending on consumer durables became installment credit provided mainly by nonbank lenders whose aggressive competition to supply households with credit allowed consumer spending to rise faster than personal income. The third direction of credit expansion concerned the purchase of stocks through the so-called brokers' loans financed originally mostly by bank credit but after the mid-1920s MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ increasingly from funds provided by nonbank lenders, such as corporations and wealthy individuals.
An often neglected fact that this analysis seeks to highlight is that the credit boom in the late 1920s and in the 2000s came on the top of a profit boom. The resultant glut of loanable funds led and sustained the credit surge and the general economic euphoria.
The Stock Market Bubble of the 1920s
The Wall Street crash of 29 October 1929 has been symbolically associated with the beginning of the GD which lasted an entire decade. Galbraith (2009 Galbraith ( [1954 ) dates the beginning of the stock market bubble as of March 1928. Scores of writers have debated the causes of the spectacular rise in stock prices that took place between the early 1928 and October 1929. A review of this literature should not detain us here. Suffice it to say that opinions roughly fall into the one of two categories:
those that argue that rising stock prices were justified by economic fundamentals (Irving Fisher was a famous example at the time), and those that attribute the boom to speculation (e.g. Galbraith 2009 Galbraith [1954 ). The view taken here is that the stock market rally can best be explained as having indeed been a bubble. However, I am skeptical of some of the explanations for what caused the bubble offered by the speculation school, such as that margin requirements were too low, along with the related claim that if those requirements had been higher, the bubble would have been avoided.
Despite widely circulated popular perceptions that low margin requirements (i.e. 'lack of regulation' in present-day parlance) caused the stock market bubble that peaked in 1929, there is no actual evidence that those requirements were low by historical standards. While this line of reasoning does not discount the notion that the ability to purchase shares on margin has facilitated speculation, it does not see this ability as the underlying cause of the speculative spree that unfolded. In fact, margin requirements before late 1928 were not lower than those prevailing since the early twentieth century or even earlier. Moreover, from around October 1928 margin requirements started rising MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ towards extraordinarily high levels. Even Galbraith (2009 Galbraith ( [1954 : 32), a popularizer of the argument that if margin requirements were raised to, say, 75 percent in January 1929 the speculative boom would have ended then, cites actual margins of 45 to 50 percent which, as Irving Fisher noted, were higher than ever before in the history of Wall Street (Smiley and Keehn, 1988) . Moreover, due to growing concerns over the stock market rally, by mid-1929 most brokers were raising margin requirements to 50 percent on most stocks and to 60-75 percent on more risky stocks (Rappoport & White, 1994, 274) . In light of this evidence, one is tempted to ask, if indeed low margin requirements were the decisive factor in stock market speculation, why did not the bubble occur before late 1928 when said requirements did not exceed 25 percent and were occasionally as low as 10 percent? The view taken here is that two factors made a particular difference in the late 1920s: the spectacular growth of brokers' loans and the rising share of such loans coming from nonbank sources, such as corporations and wealthy individuals. Wright (1929) traces the origins of this 'flood of money for the financing of speculation' to the large post-World War One gold imports propping up the easy money policy of the banks which stimulated business expansion, new capital issues, and refinancing at low rates. The resultant surge of corporate profits created surplus funds which flowed into the call market and fed the stock market boom.
Brokers' loans were loans made to stockbrokers enabling them to purchase securities for their clients on margin. Consistent reporting of such loans did not exist before 1918. Between that year and 1923, the volume of brokers' loans at the New York Stock Exchange fluctuated between $1 and 2 billion and started to increase rapidly afterwards. By the end of 1925 brokers' loans reached $3.5 billion, by the end of 1927 nearly $4.5 billion, and at the peak of 1929, more than 8.5 billion (Snyder, 1930) . Brokers' loans consisted of 'time loans', almost exclusively offered by banks, and 'call loans', supplied by nonbank sources. The practice of wealthy individuals and corporations lending temporarily idle funds to the brokers for margin purchases existed even before World War MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ One. But the share of call loans in total brokers' loans after the war rarely exceeded 30 percent with the exception of a temporary rise in 1920-1. This share started to expand from the mid-1920s on to reach 77.89 percent in October 1929 (Smiley & Keehn, 1988, 136, Table 1 ). The composition of brokers' loans from nonbank sources in September 1929 as reported by the six largest member banks in New York City was as follows: corporations -56 percent; individuals -20 percent; investment trusts -14 percent; and foreign -10 percent (Ibid, 137) . The main source of corporate funds flowing into brokers' loans was retained earnings. The main reason for directing the latter into brokers' loans was that interest rates on call loans exceeded possible returns on any other type of investment, let alone saving. The peak amount advanced to brokers by corporations ranged from $500,000 to $157,579,000. During 1929, Standard Oil of New Jersey contributed a daily average of $69 million to the call market while Electric Bond and Share averaged over $100 million (Galbraith, 2009 (Galbraith, [1954 : 31).
In 1928-29, there was a lively debate among academics and policy-makers about the effects of diversion of credit from what was considered legitimate business purposes into speculative stockmarket transactions. The Federal Reserve's (Fed) growing concern over the 'extraordinary absorption of funds in speculative loans, which has characterized the credit movement during the past year or more' and the fear of possible 'detrimental effects on business' (Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1929) informed its policies over that period. Between January and July 1928, the discount rate was raised from 3.5 to 5 percent. A further increase to 6 percent followed in February 1929.
These actions did not seem to make much of a difference to the supply and demand for loans in the call market where interest rates fluctuated between 6 and 20 percent. As these high interest rates made it more profitable for companies and wealthy individuals to lend money on call than to buy commercial paper, a major reallocation of credit in the money and capital markets ensued. Thus, between September 1927 and September 1929 commercial paper outstanding declined from $600 MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ million to $265 million which increased the demand for commercial bank loans, discounts, and Federal Reserve funds. Wright (1929, 124) sums up the overall dynamic as follows: 'It seems then that the commercial banks and the Reserve banks have indirectly financed the stock-market speculation by financing commerce while the corporations whose production and marketing were being financed by bank credit lent their funds to the stock market.'
The Housing Bubble of the 2000s What were the factors that enabled and sustained the spectacular surge in housing values thereby feeding the bubble and, ultimately, leading to its burst? Four different explanations will be addressed here: government policies/regulatory failure, speculation, the low-interest-rate policy of the Fed, and capital inflows resulting from savings glut in developing countries. While these views point to important aspects of the problem, none of them can offer in itself a sufficient or compelling explanation of the origins of the bubble. It is rather by critically interrogating all of them that we arrive at a more plausible explanation of those origins.
The first group of explanations revolve around policies and practices that enabled subprime MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ mortgage lending. Subprime mortgages are extended to borrowers who display a number of high credit risk characteristics including, without being limited to, recent delinquencies, repossession, foreclosure, or even bankruptcy, a relatively high default probability as evidenced by a credit score of 660 or below, and debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or higher. Accounts of the crisis emphasizing its subprime origins have a conservative and a liberal strain. Both see the crisis as a result of policy mistakes and institutional failure but while conservative analysts tend to attribute the subprime crisis to government policies aiming at extending homeownership to previously excluded constituencies, such as lower-income groups and racial minorities, liberals blame government institutions for failing to provide adequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector as well as for the inability or unwillingness to take decisive action in curbing predatory lending practices.
The view taken here is that the origins of the crisis go deeper than institutional failures and can be fully understood only when considered within broader socio-economic and historical contexts. These origins hark back to the confluence of two factors: the saturation of the US housing market that became apparent by the 1970s, and the opportunity offered by the demands of the civil rights movement to dismantle discriminatory lending practices, thereby expanding the size of that market. The contribution of housing to the postwar economic miracle in the US is difficult to exaggerate. Housing affects the economy through several main channels. First, investment in residential construction directly contributes to GDP growth. Second, the purchase of housing stimulates the demand for consumer durables and housing-related services including home improvement, cleaning, gardening, etc. Third, a host of industries offering legal, financial and insurance services depend critically on housing transaction volumes. Finally, the so-called wealth effect resulting from the appreciation of housing values boosts total spending in the economy.
By the late 1970s/early 1980s, the potential of homeownership as a key driver of growth in the American economy seemed largely exhausted as the overwhelming majority of eligible MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ homeowner candidates had been housed. The homeownership rate, which stood at 43.6 percent in 1940, reached a periodic peak of almost 65 percent in the mid-1970s. Population growth was far from sufficient to keep the housing machine going at its previous pace; besides, it was strongly skewed toward minority groups where homeownership rates were lagging behind. Thus, a feasible course of action was to extend homeownership to previously excluded segments of society, such as African Americans, other minorities, women, and the poor. This, in turn, meant the abolishment of discriminatory lending practices known as 'redlining' which effectively prohibited lending in certain areas, typically populated by minorities, because of the general characteristics of the neighborhood rather than of the specific property to be mortgaged. Subprime lending was further enabled by the deregulation of the mortgage markets that began in the 1980s with several key pieces of legislation which led to the massive growth of securitization and the vertical disintegration of the lending industry epitomized in the transition from the traditional 'originate-and-hold' to 'originate-anddistribute' model of lending (Ivanova, 2011a) . (Greenspan, 2010: 206) .
Nonbank lenders that were very active in supplying subprime mortgages were not subject to the regulations that applied to traditional banks and thrifts. Furthermore, the infrastructure of securitization offered various ways for traditional bank lenders to circumvent existing regulation.
Certainly, some of the worst excesses and outright predatory practices could have been avoided under stricter lending requirements. But, arguably, more extensive regulation altogether prohibiting the innovative mortgage products sold to customers who often could not afford to service them would have defeated the purpose of the entire enterprise. That purpose, commonly embraced by government and business, was to expand the size of the housing market by allowing access of new entrants. These new entrants could only come from previously underserved constituencies that were disproportionately poor and riskier (i.e. subprime). The way to turn such candidates into homeowners was to change the underwriting standards and the structure of mortgages.
Another group of explanations of the origins of the recent housing bubble emphasize the role of speculation. Asset-price bubbles have been a recurring event throughout history and speculation represents the oldest and most common explanation of their origins. Shiller (2008: 3) seems to confirm the popular dictum that the only lesson from history is that nobody learns from it, MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ by blaming the housing bubble on the general lack of intelligence about how to handle bubbles: 'the housing bubble that created the subprime crisis ultimately grew as big as it did because we as a society do not understand, or know how to deal with, speculative bubbles'. He sees 'an epidemic of irrational public enthusiasm for housing investment [as] the core of the problem' and concludes that 'the ultimate cause of the global financial crisis is the psychology of the real estate bubble (with contributions from the stock market bubble before that)' (Shiller, 2008: 3) . Speculation and irrational behavior play a part in many explanations of bubbles but rarely have they been assigned such a central role. Even more questionable is the assertion that 'the psychology of the real estate bubble' was 'the ultimate cause of the global financial crisis'. Bubbles occur with relative frequency but they do not always bring about an economic implosion. Arguably, it takes something more than 'irrational exuberance' and momentum trading to produce an economic collapse of the magnitude of the GR. As this analysis strives to emphasize, it is the combination of financial and structural factors that allows irrational exuberance to power and sustain a bubble whose burst can induce economywide collapse.
As commonly acknowledged, asset-price bubbles are unlikely to arise without easy access to credit; that is, a general surge in liquidity is required for a boom to become a bubble (Kindleberger, 2005) . The policy of the central bank plays an essential role in the shaping of credit conditions. However, as the experience of the 1920s and the 2000s teaches us, any analysis of the impact of monetary policy should take into account that the general availability of loanable funds is significantly influenced by nonmonetary factors, such as corporate profitability and the distribution of income. The aggressive expansionary policy of the Fed under Alan Greenspan pursuant to the dot-com crash is often credited with having created the housing bubble. Indeed, in the course of 2001, the Fed drastically reduced its target for the federal funds rate and the discount rate. In the twelve months beginning in July 2003, these rates stood, respectively, at 1 and 2 percent before the MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Fed started raising them. While this policy may have been part of the reason why the housing boom turned into a bubble, it is important to emphasize that substantial increases in housing prices preceded the monetary expansion. Thus, while according to the Case-Shiller National Index housing prices were quite stable in the early 1990s (there was an increase of only 2.6 percent in 1990-4), in 1995-2000 they increased 27.5 percent, followed by a 42-percent increase between the first quarter of 2001 and the housing peak in the second quarter of 2006. Notably, the initial increase started when the short-term interest rates were still relatively high: In the period 1995-2000 both the federal funds rate and the discount rate averaged over 5 percent and never fell below 4.5 percent. The embattled former Fed Chairman has frequently emphasized this fact in order to argue that it 'was long-term interest rates that galvanized home asset prices, not the overnight rates of central banks, as has become the seeming conventional wisdom' (Greenspan, 2010: 235) . Greenspan further argues that the decline in the interest rates on fixed-rate long-term mortgage loans, relative to their mid-2000 peak, began 6 months before the Fed started easing the federal funds rate in January 2001. In the meantime, a growing body of research has found evidence that foreign investors' demand for US government bonds has played a role in the suppression of the long-term interest rates (e.g. Warnock & Warnock, 2009; Goda et al., 2011; Goda & Lisandrou, 2014) .
In 2005, the soon-to-be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Ben Bernanke coined the notion of a global saving glut in an attempt to explain the steep upward trajectory of the US current account deficit (CAD) and the low level of long-term interest rates (Bernanke, 2005) National saving has three components: government saving, corporate saving of the financial and nonfinancial sector, and household saving. Chinese households, the poster child of thrift in the global economy, have allegedly been saving too much and consuming too little; the result is an imbalanced economy that could be rebalanced, so the popular wisdom goes, by a reduction in household saving and an increase in consumption. However, a growing body of research has challenged the view that rising household saving is the key factor behind rising total saving in China while finding instead that the high national saving rate can be attributed to the growing shares of both government and corporate savings (e.g. Anderson, 2009; He & Cao, 2007; Yang & Jianfeng, 2009 ). Furthermore, the low level of domestic consumption does not seem to have been driven by the households' propensity to save, which has actually trended downwards, but by the persistent MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ decrease in the households' share of national disposable income (Luo & Zhang, 2010; Yang & Jianfeng, 2009 ).
The corporate saving glut, directly linked to the changing balance between profits and wages in national income, is not a phenomenon peculiar to China, or to 'developing countries', but represents a secular trend which manifests itself globally. Comparing corporate saving rates across countries on the basis of firm level data, Bayoumi et al. (2010) find that Chinese firms do not have a significantly higher saving rate (relative to total assets) than the global average. In fact, since the early 2000s, the magnitude of the increase of corporate saving in industrialized countries has been far greater than the corresponding rise of total saving in emerging economies. (World Wealth Report, 2005 . In 2005, the combined assets of pensions, insurance and mutual funds totaled $46 trillion (BIS, 2007) . While excess savings in EMDEs undoubtedly contributed to the global demand for safe and not-so-safe US assets, its share in the sizeable pool of global investable funds seems relatively modest.
Moreover, in the meantime excess saving in EMDEs has significantly declined. By contrast, growth in other key sources of global liquidity seems unlikely to subside in near future.
The rising share of total saving originating from the corporate sector has been part and MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ parcel of the decline in the labor share of national income. While analysts have offered different explanations for the causes of this phenomenon, they all point to a global trend dating back to the mid-1980s (Ellis & Smith, 2007; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014; Kristal, 2010; Rodriguez & Jayadev, 2010; Stockhammer, 2013) . The related tendencies of lagging labor and growing corporate share along with a surge in corporate saving despite high dividend payments have strongly characterized the US economy both in the 1920s and in the 2000s.
Key Elements of Fundamental Fragility in the US Economy Then and Now
As Galbraith (2009 Galbraith ( [1954 ) remarks, it is easier to explain the 1929 stock market crash than the Depression that followed. Why does the burst of one bubble trigger economy-wide and global collapse while the effects of another remain limited? The 1987 US stock market bubble had minimal effects on the overall economy. Similarly, the collapse of the dot-com bubble was followed by one of the mildest recessions in postwar history in terms of real GDP (although, admittedly not in terms of employment) while the financial sector remained largely unaffected. As this paper argues, neither the outbreak nor the severity of the GD and the GR can be fully understood by focusing on the particular features of the stock market or the housing bubble. Rather, the structural fragility of the economy that manifested itself in these bubbles was the underlying reason for the economy-wide collapse that followed.
The 'roaring' twenties and the 'exuberant' 2000s have entered official history as times of growing 'prosperity'. In the recent period, however, it is difficult to challenge the notion that this prosperity failed to deliver rising labor incomes in light of the evidence that real wage growth for the majority of the populace has been modest to non-existent. By contrast, while workers in the 1920s experienced some real wage growth, its relative magnitude has often been exaggerated. In actuality, a closer look at the evidence then and now reveals a deepening structural imbalance between labor MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ and capital which manifests itself through two main channels: the rising share of corporate profits and falling wage share of national income, and the spectacular growth of top incomes along with rising household indebtedness in the lower ranks of the income distribution.
Wages and Labor Share
Since the mid-1970s, real wage gains for the majority of American workers have been weak to nonexistent. As shown in Figure 5 , real average weekly earnings in the private nonfarm sector declined significantly between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, increased moderately in the late 1990s and were almost flat in [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The general stagnation of labor income has gone along with deepening wage inequality which in the 1990s superficially manifested itself as increasing returns to skills and education (Ivanova, 2015) . Between 1975 and 1998, the annual earnings ratios between college-educated and high-school-educated workers increased from 1.5 to 1.92 for male workers and from 1.45 to 1.76 for female workers. In particular, the earnings of men with a bachelor's degree increased by 17 percent and those of men with an advanced degree (master's or higher) grew by 25 percent, while the earnings of men who did not graduate college plummeted by 15 percent (Wolff, 2000) . Overall, the much debated rising return to skills in the 1990s was to a significant extent due to the declining real earnings of less educated workers.
The earnings performance changed temporarily in the late 1990s when workers in all educational categories saw real wage growth. However, after 2000, all these groups of workers experienced declines in real earnings, such that for the entire period 1991-2010 period average real income grew less than 10 percent for all educational categories. The overall poor real earnings performance improves only slightly when we factor in the roughly 18 percent of total labor compensation accounted for by various nonmonetary benefits ranging from health insurance to stock options (Haskel et al., 2012) . MN Do we observe similar tendencies in the 1920s? Because of the lack of consistent national records before 1929, reliable economic data are somewhat difficult to obtain and, to the extent that such are available, they are typically estimates. As manufacturing was the most dynamic sector of the economy at that time, it is not unreasonable to take manufacturing wages as a benchmark.
According to Douglas (1929) , real wages of manufacturing workers increased 28 percent between 1914 and 1927 (it should be noted that 1914 was a recession year and choosing it as a base inflates the result). There was nothing spectacular about wage growth during the roaring twenties. The only year of significant change was 1928 when real wages of manufacturing workers grew by 6 percent which Douglas (1929) decomposes into a five-percent increase in average money earnings and onepercent decrease in living costs. Brissenden's (1929) Despite the real wage gains during the boom decade of the 1920s, wage growth was lagging behind the growth of capital income which led to a decline of the wage share. The latter, measured as percent of value added for all manufacturing industries, peaked at 45 percent in 1921 (a recession year) and after a continuous decline reached 36.9 percent in 1929 without starting to recover until 1935 (Steindl, 1952, 76, Table 9 ). It is important to note that first, Steindl's very detailed calculations show significant variations in wage shares across industries, and second, his measure of the wage share does not include salaries which he considers a part of overhead cost. He estimates that the ratio of salaries to value added between 1923 and 1929 actually increased from 12.1 percent to 13.6 percent.
The Top-Heavy Income Distribution
The fall in the labor share of national income over the last three decades has been accompanied by rising income inequality. The fact that labor earnings have largely stagnated since the late 1970s, except for the second half of the 1990s, should not be taken to imply that there has been no income growth at all. Labor earnings, comprising wages, salaries, and self-employment income, represent only one, albeit the largest, component of money income as defined by the US Census Bureau. 2 Piketty and Saez base their analysis on the Internal Revenue Service tax tables which show the number of tax filers, their incomes, and various income sources. By focusing on 'market income', their estimates leave out various government transfer payments which were minimal in the 1920s but constitute a significant part of the income at present, particularly for lower-income households. Other factors which render the task of comparing levels of inequality on the basis of tax returns more difficult include differences in income tax coverage over time, different definitions of income, and the effect of changes in the top marginal rate on reported personal incomes. (Barba & Pivetti, 2009; Brennan, 2014) . The debt burden of low-and middle income households has risen disproportionately to their income. In 1989, there was no significant difference between the debt-toincome ratios of families in the lowest quintile and all families (0.89 compared to 0.88). In 1995, the ratio for the bottom 20 percent was 1.85 compared to 1.09 overall. By 2004, this ratio has risen to 2.37 percent. In 1989-2004, mean debt-to-income ratios for all families increased from 0.88 to 1.47 but the increase was particularly pronounced for the bottom 90 percent and barely noticeable at the top (Brown, 2008, 10) . Between 1983 and 2007, the debt-to-income ratio of the bottom 95 percent of the income distribution more than doubled reaching close to 140 percent, while the debt-toincome ratio of the richest 5 percent of the US population has remained constant at around 70 percent (Kumhof & Rancière, 2010) .
Between 2000 and the peak year 2007, residential mortgage debt outstanding for one-to-four family houses and multifamily properties almost doubled from $6.1 trillion to $11.96 trillion. Total mortgage debt outstanding for residential, farm, and commercial properties increased in the same period from $6.75 trillion to $14.66 trillion or 117 percent. The growth of mortgage debt in the 1920s was even more spectacular (although from much lower levels in absolute terms). According to Persons' (1930, 104) estimate, from 1920 to 1929 total residential mortgages outstanding increased MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ from $11.1 billion to $27.1 billion or 140 percent. A look at the trajectory of consumer credit is also instructive. Largely due to the widespread use of installment credit for the purchase of consumer durables, consumer debt as a percentage of household income doubled from 4.68 percent in 1920 to 9.34 percent in 1929 (Olney, 1991, 87-90, The decline has not been uniform as high-income households tend to save more than low-and middle-income households both in absolute and relative terms. Table 2 displays saving rates by income quintile calculated by deducting the mean expenditure for every quintile from after-tax-income and expressing the difference as percentage of income. Negative saving rates mean that household consumption exceeded income and the difference was financed either from savings from previous years or, most likely, borrowing. The significantly negative saving rates for the lowest two quintiles are, at least partially, due to income underreporting (see Rogers & Gray, 1994) . Since 1989, the saving rates for the upper two income quintiles have trended upward, but the difference has been most pronounced in the top quintile whose saving as a share of income has risen from 22 percent in 1989 to 37.1 percent in 2012.
Rising income inequality in the 1920s was also reflected in differential saving rates. Analyzing the effects of income distribution on the percentage of total income saved, America's Capacity to MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Consume (ACC), an influential volume, co-authored by Moulton, Leven, and Warburton and published by the Brookings Institution in 1934, arrived at two conclusions. First, the savings of the majority of the population constituted a negligible portion of total savings. Moulton (1935, 136-7) estimates that in 1929, 91 percent of families including all those with income under $5,000 saved about $4 billion or slightly above 25 percent of total savings, while the savings of 2.3 percent of families with income over $10,000 amounted to over two-thirds of the total. Moulton's estimates of total savings included capital gains. If those, amounting to $7.5 billion, were deducted from his original estimate of $20 billion of savings in 1929, one arrives at around $12.5 billion (Villard, 1937) . Correspondingly, the above share of 91 percent of families in total savings should be about one third which does not significantly alter the situation. Second, in the period 1914-29, the proportion of national income received by those with incomes of $5,000 and above showed a marked upward trend while the proportion received by the group below the $5,000 income level showed a corresponding downward trend (Lewis, 1935, 533) . ACC concluded that rising incomes in the upper-income brackets ($5,000 and above) resulted in higher saving rates and growth in total savings: 'the fact that there has been a greater increase in incomes received by the upper than by the lower income classes has tended automatically to increase the aggregate volume of savings. The tendency has been especially marked during the last decade ' (Moulton et al, 1934, 111) .
The overall upward trend of aggregate saving along with the rising rates of both personal and corporate saving in the 1920s constitutes a significant difference between then and now. The fall in personal saving in the 2000s was paralleled by an increase in corporate saving which was not only interest and dividend payments more than doubled from $6.5 billion to $13.28 billion (Kreps, 1935, 565 , Table 1 (Lauck, 1934, 784-5) . Kreps (1935, 564) estimates that by 1933 labor income had fallen to 65 percent of the 1923-25 average while dividends and interest payments still amounted to 93 percent of the 1923-25 average. By 1931 corporate profits had entered negative territory but the collapse was not at all uniform. In fact, some of the biggest corporations weathered the storm tolerably well. As Sloan (1936, 40) documents about the fortunes of the leading 135 industrial corporations, [1933] than at the beginning [1922] . And at the end of Table 3 ). Offshoring and offshore outsourcing emerged as strategies for reducing input costs and maximizing profits in response to the 1970s profitability crisis of the Fordist industrial model. The domestic counterpart of this process has been a trend towards less capital investment and alternative uses of retained earnings. The offshore outsourcing of production has gone along with the repatriation of profits which has contributed to the so-called financialization of the US economy in terms of an increased offering of financial services by nonfinancial firms, higher dividend payments, and the growing acquisitions of financial assets including the purchase of companies' own shares for the purpose of raising stock prices (Medlen, 2010; Milberg & Winkler, 2010; Orhangazi, 2008) . In fact, the accumulation of abnormally high cash holdings has been driven by US multinational corporations (MNCs). In the late 1990s, the cash holdings of the latter were not MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ larger than those of purely domestic firms. This situation changed over the 2000s and by 2010, US MNCs held over 3 percent more assets in cash than comparable domestic firms or foreign MNCs (Pinkowitz et al., 2012) .
At the end of the cycle, despite the enormous losses which had been sustained, and despite the fact that during the three years 1931-1933 security owners received cash disbursement of over a billion dollars in excess of the net available for the common [dividends] in those three years -despite these facts, our 135 corporations had 710 millions more cash in their coffers at the end of the cycle
The build-up of corporate surplus funds added to the global pool of idle funds that fueled the housing bubble by raising the demand for various forms of financial 'investments'. Thus, the US money and securities markets in the 2000s bear a remarkable resemblance to the call market of the late 1920s. While in the late 1920s surplus capital went into the call market to finance brokers' loans thereby fueling the stock market bubble, in the recent period, idle funds from all over the world fostered the US housing bubble by flooding financial markets with liquidity.
Instead of a Conclusion: The Great Recession Is Different
The GD and the GR were triggered by the burst of a stock market and a housing bubble but to trigger something does not mean to cause it. This analysis has highlighted the unfolding of similar dynamics in the US economy then and now: surging corporate profits, relative stagnation of labor income, rising inequality, growing debt burden for the lower classes, overaccumulation of savings by the upper classes, credits booms, asset bubbles, and crashes that depressed the entire economy for years to come. I would like to conclude with a warning that the acknowledgment of those similarities could be gravely misleading if they were used to justify claims that the policies enacted to bring the economy out of the Depression can work again in some modified form to rid us of the consequences of the GR. For the American economy then and now is fundamentally different.
Despite the possible presence of structural and superficial similarities, no two crises are fully alike. In the analysis of crises, it is important to distinguish between general factors pertaining to the nature of capitalism as a production and monetary system (those are the factors that account for possible similarities) and specific ones related to the concrete level of development of this system MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ within particular socio-historical frameworks and circumstances (those are the factors that account for the differences). The accumulation of surplus capital as a result of surging corporate profits was among the leading causes of the GD and the GR. But in the first case, the surplus of capital led to overinvestment relative to effective demand. In the second case, there is surplus of capital relative to profitable investment opportunities in the domestic economy in addition to the looming prospects of actual and potential weak demand.
The origins of the GD lay in overinvestment relative to consumer demand against the backdrop of labor abundance and low wages that ultimately drove the economy into an underconsumption trap; hence the depth, length, and severity of the slump (Devine, 1983; 1994) .
Consumption in highly unequal societies depends critically on the combination of continuous borrowing by low-and middle-income households and the luxury spending of the rich. In time, the relative importance of the latter is bound to increase as rising debt-to-income ratios impede further borrowing. As summed up by Gjerstad & Smith (2009: 289) , '[t] he crash of October 1929 resulted from a sudden recognition that the credit system had been stretched to its limit: New houses and consumer durables could be produced, but creditworthy borrowers were scarce'. The effects of the stock market crash were almost immediately felt in the consumer goods market as collapsing fortunes of rich individuals led to declining orders for dispensable luxury goods. Producers reacted to falling demand and investment was curtailed (Moulton, 1935) . These dynamics may seem superficially similar to those underlying the run-up to the GR but that is not all there is to it.
The US economic and military success in the postwar age of high mass consumption was based on the dramatic expansion of potential output during the Depression years due to the combination of continued growth of manufacturing productivity and the spillover effects in transportation and distribution resulting from the extension of public infrastructure (Field, 2011) .
Despite the overall slowdown of investment and productivity growth in the 1930s, corporations MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ continued to invest in research and development and to enhance their innovative capabilities. These developments underlay the extraordinary level of profitability reached during and immediately after World War Two which significantly overshot both the pre-Depression and postwar trends. This 'leap forward' was attributable to a strong wave of technological change manifest in a 40-percent increase in multifactor productivity and associated with an 'autonomous' substitution of equipment for structures in the capital stock (Duménil et al., 1993) .
The GR was preceded by a massive wave of overinvestment in construction which should not be confused with a general investment boom. The housing bubble was sustained by the combination of strong institutional support for the ideology and practice of homeownership which gave rise to the lowest mortgage lending standards in history, low interest rates, a financial industry eager to innovate, and a massive demand for, preferably, safe and, preferably, high-yield assets by institutional investors, corporations, wealthy individuals, governments, sovereign wealth funds, etc.; that is, multiple trillions of idle money in the global economy were looking for a safe haven. The GR started in the US but had global origins, and not merely global impact. It was, in fact, the first crisis of capitalism as a system of globalized production characterized by the geographical separation between the production of value and the distribution of value along with the persistent imbalances this spatial configuration generates (Ivanova, 2011c (Ivanova, , 2013 . And yet, many accounts of the crisis tend to ignore the profound ways in which the globalization of production has transformed the structure and underpinnings of domestic demand and profitability. Unsurprisingly, many analysts have found it difficult to frame the GR as either a demandside or a supply-side crisis which has resulted in the frequent invocation of the specter of financialization as the main culprit. Financialization is a notion used to describe a range of issues from the preponderance of shareholder value, to the rising share of the financial sector's profits, and the growing importance of financial markets and institutions. The majority of the existing accounts MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ of financialization presume a clear-cut separation between production, seen as socially beneficial, and finance, perceived as potentially or actually parasitic due to its tendency to pursue speculative profits at the expense of productive investment (Ivanova, 2015) . The notion of an antagonistic relation between production and finance harks back to Keynes' (1997 Keynes' ( [1936 , 376) distinction between the productive (functioning) capitalist and the rentier as the 'function-less investor' who profits from interest and rent 'without sacrifice'. This opposition has little basis in contemporary capitalism. During the early stages of industrialization, the role of the industrial capitalist seemed opposed to that of the rentier because of his direct participation in the production process. With the advent of the business corporation, the provision of capital (ownership) was separated from the running of the enterprise (management). This separation deepened in the subsequent evolution of the corporate form. Once the organization of production is entrusted to hired management, the difference between the 'productive' capitalist and the rentier starts to blur along with the difference between profit of enterprise, interest, and rent. The origins of present-day financialization hark as far back as the emergence of the 'modern corporation' in the late nineteenth century. From its very inception as the joint-stock company to its present-day giant multinational form, the corporation has embodied and reproduced the dialectic of production and finance. The term 'absentee ownership', introduced by Veblen (1997 Veblen ( [1923 ), refers not merely, as popularly understood, to the separation of ownership and management/control but to the peculiar form of 'ownership' epitomized in the corporate form. The corporation itself is the (absentee) owner of all business assets. The shareholders do not own real assets but shares -pieces of paper conferring legal rights, such as the right to receive dividends or vote for directors. They are functionless investors regardless of what the corporation does. The corporation -national or multinational -is a financial enterprise that may also be involved in the business of actual production. It is, by its very essence, 'a pecuniary institution, not an industrial appliance' (Veblen, 1997 (Veblen, [1923 , 83). The enormous productive capacity MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ of the modern corporation, and of the type of capitalism based on it, lies at the core of the host of issues associated with profitability, underconsumption, overinvestment, and financialization crises. Despite the impressive decline of the CAD to $390 billion in 2014, the deficit on the balance on goods was still $741 billion and most unlikely to significantly decrease in near future (Ivanova, 2015) .
The import-oriented structure of US consumption and production explains why buoyant consumer spending during the bubble years and beyond has done relatively little to stimulate domestic investment.
Similar considerations should be taken into account in discussions of profitability trends in the US economy. Marxist economists, in particular, observe the movements of the profit rate with keen interest as the growth dynamic of a capitalist economy is seen as directly linked to the general rate of profit it generates. While there is no common agreement as to whether the rate of profit has risen or fallen prior to the recent crisis, most accounts point to the former (see Basu & Vasudevan (2013) for an overview). The mass of profits has undoubtedly risen, thereby being one of the fundamental causes of both crises studied here. It should be noted that the feasibility of the whole exercise of measuring the US rate of profit as the ratio of domestic profits to the stock of domestic investment appears somewhat questionable. The profits generated within a MNC cannot be simply split into domestic and overseas components as the spatial reorganization of production through offshoring and outsourcing raises profitability both domestically and globally. For example, labor cost saving through offshoring accounts for a large share of domestic productivity growth in manufacturing (Houseman, 2007) . Thus, the improved profitability of domestic business may be simply evidence that the US MNCs have successfully optimized their operations through global restructuring.
The idea that the capacity of capitalism to continuously revolutionize its means of MN Ivanova * Profit Growth in Boom and Bust: The Great Recession and the Great Depression in Comparative Perspective ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ production may be running out of steam is anathema to the great majority of economists (mainstream and Marxist alike). And yet there has been a recognizable slowdown in capitalism's general technological capacity to innovate in a way that could spur new investment and raise productivity growth to levels comparable with the postwar Golden Age. Different factors can account for the decline of innovation. On the one hand, there are grand-scale, civilizational factors, such as the forces of the Second Industrial Revolution that, in Gordon's (2012) view, were unique and cannot be repeated. The resultant rapid rise in living standards is also becoming impossible to sustain. On the other hand, it can be argued that the tendency to monopolization that in one form or another has characterized American capitalism throughout its history has also eroded competition and hampered innovation (Hymer, 1979; Foster & McChesney, 2012) . The combination of structural supply-side and demand-side weaknesses does not bode well for the future of the US economy. Gordon (2012) aptly captures the demand-side challenges under the heading of 'six headwinds'. These include the reverse motion of the 'demographic dividend', the plateau in educational attainment combined with the 'cost disease' in higher education, rising inequality, the globalization of production and its vindication of the factor-price equalization theorem, energy and environmental challenges, and the overhang of consumer and government debt.
In sum, the growth prospects for American capitalism then and now are vastly different.
World War Two served as a huge stimulus for the depressed economy at a time when this was exactly what was needed. The institutional regulation of demand whose foundations were laid down by the New Deal and solidified in the postwar period played an essential role in stabilizing accumulation under mass production Fordist capitalism. The present situation is different. This is not a crisis that can be solved through the institutional re-regulation of demand as the existing problems extend to the core structure of capital accumulation.
